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WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF BENEFITS UNDER
THE LONGSHORE AND HARBORWORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT: A COMPROMISE
APPROACH
Workers' compensation statutes were an expression of an entirely new
social principle when first enacted in the early 1900's. 1 At the heart of the
compensation statutes was a legislative compromise between the rights of
employees and employers.2 In recent years, however, the legislative com-
promise has come under increasing stress, as many compensation systems
have not kept pace with social and legal changes. 3 As tort liability expanded
and administrative delays lengthened, injured employees have attempted to
circumvent the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the compensation stat-
utes, which limit an employer's liability to statutory benefits, and recover
additional compensation. Allegations against an employer and its workers'
compensation carrier for wrongfully delaying or terminating benefits has
been a common tactic. The two theories most frequently used to establish
liability in these cases are intentional infliction of emotional distress and
bad faith refusal to pay benefits. As more and more injured employees try to
recover both statutory compensation payments and common law tort
damages, the courts face a difficult task in deciding when to allow these
suits without opening the floodgates of litigation and disintegrating the
compensation system.
While many state supreme courts have considered whether to allow
actions against a compensation insurer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and bad faith, the issues have not been clearly settled under
one federal compensation statute, the Longshore and Harborworkers'
1. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.00 (1985).
2. Theoretically, these statutes compensate injured workers quickly and adequately by imposing
liability on an employer without proof of fault, yet limit the liability of employers to less than what might
be available in an ordinary tort action. See A. MILLus & W. GENTILE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
AND INSURANCE 47-48 (1st ed. 1976); Love, Actionsfor Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between
the Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CALIF.
L. REv. 857, 874-75 (1985); Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The
Employee's Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 555, 555-56 (1963).
3. See generally Comment, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Com-
pensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1644 (1983). Two principal problems have arisen. First, the
system has become disadvantageous to injured employees in light of the expansion of tort liability since
the early 1900's. Id. Second, the agencies administering the compensation plans are overworked and
understaffed. These conditions frequently result in long delays in resolving disputed compensation
claims. Id. Unscrupulous employers and insurers can terminate benefits without just cause and force an
employee to wait up to a year without benefits for an administrative hearing. See, e.g., Sample v.
Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1206 (1986) (nine- and ten-month
delays under the LHWCA); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tex. 1985)
(one-year delay under the LHWCA).
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Compensation Act (LHWCA). 4 Three federal courts have apparently
adopted different approaches, modeled after the three approaches taken by
state courts. This Comment argues that the "Compromise approach,"
which allows actions based on intentional infliction of emotional distress
but rejects actions based on bad faith, is most consistent with the policies
underlying the LHWCA and should be followed by the courts.
I. BACKGROUND
Workers' compensation laws were enacted in response to the coinci-
dence of a sharp increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the
factory system and a decrease in the employees' common law remedies for
their injuries. 5 The LHWCA arose for the same reasons, but only became
necessary because of several rulings by the United States Supreme Court
that prevented state compensation acts from applying to maritime work-
ers. 6 Originally, Congress patterned the LHWCA after the state acts. 7
A. Policies and Structure of State Compensation Acts and the LHWCA
The structures of the LHWCA and the state acts generally embody three
policies, reflecting a legislative compromise between the interests of em-
ployees and employers. First, employees are expected to receive swift and
certain payment without resort to a lawsuit because the LHWCA requires
4. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950 (1986).
5. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.00. Recovery against an employer under turn-of-the-century
common law principles was exceptionally difficult. Id. § 4.30, at 27 (the employee at common law was
remediless in 83% of a!l cases). First, employees had the difficult burden of proving employer
negligence under the limited common law duties imposed against employers. Second, the three
formidable defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule
frequently defeated recovery. Third, co-workers were often unwilling to testify against employers. v.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at
568-72 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]; Comment, supra note 3, at 1644; Note, Intentional Torts
Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 181, 182-83
(1983).
6. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Supreme Court rejected the application
of state compensation laws to maritime workers. In Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219
(1924) and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). the Supreme Court struck down
congressional statutes providing for coverage of maritime workers through existing state compensation
statutes. The Supreme Court finally upheld the constitutionality of the LHWCA in Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, §§ 6-45 to -48, at
404-17 (2d ed. 1975); Clark, The Expanding Coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 849, 851-52 (1983).
7. The LHWCA, as enacted in 1927, was patterned after the New York Compensation Act. 4 A.
LARSON, supra note I, § 89.10, at 16-165 (1986); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6. § 6-46, at
408.
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payment of benefits by an employer without proof of fault.8 All the
employee must prove is that the injury falls within the coverage provisions
of the LHWCA. 9 Congress established a federal agency, the Office of
Workers' Compensation, to process LHWCA claims and handle any dis-
putes. 10 In addition, the LHWCA imposes various sanctions for late pay-
ment, including prejudgment interest, 1 percentage penalties, 12 and attor-
neys' fees to insure swift and certain payment. 13
Second, in return for the assumed swift and certain payment, employees
must accept a lower level of benefits than they might receive if they sued at
common law. 14 The LHWCA limits an employer's liability to that pre-
scribed in the Act with a provision generally known as the "exclusive
remedy clause." 15 The exclusive remedy clause is the heart of the legis-
lative compromise between the rights of employers and employees. 16
8. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902-903 (1986). Theoretically, this provision avoids the delays and excessive
costs associated with tort litigation. "[The LHWCA] eliminates to a large extent the delay, suffering
hardship, and expense incident to the long time in which it took to reach a case after it was submitted to
the court because of the congestion in the courts, with damage cases crowding the docket." 68 CONG.
REc. 5412 (1927) (statement of Rep. Underhill).
9. Most compensation acts cover any accidental personal injury that occurs within the scope of the
employee's duties. The LHWCA provides that compensation shall be payable if disability or death
results from an injury to a maritime employee upon navigable water. 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (1986).
Injury is defined as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment." Id.
§ 902(2).
10. See id. §§ 919, 921, 927, 939, 940 (dealing with procedure in respect of claims, review of
compensation orders, and administration by the Secretary of Labor and the Deputy Commissioner).
11. See, e.g., Grant v. Portland Stevedore Co., 16 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 267 (1984).
12. Under the LHWCA, if the employer or insurer fails to pay benefits after they become due but
prior to a formal award, a 10% penalty is imposed. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(e) (1986). The employer may
controvert a claim and refuse to pay, but once an award is made, if the employer fails to pay benefits, a
20% penalty is assessed. Id. § 914(f).
13. Attorneys' fees are assessed whenever the claimant utilizes the services of an attorney and is
successful in establishing the claim. Id. § 928.
14. LHWCA compensation benefits vary depending upon the type of injury, but are limited to two-
thirds of an employee's average weekly wage for injuries classified as temporary total disability. Id.
§ 908(b). The LHWCA also requires payment of all medical bills related to the injury. Id. § 907. Thus,
an employee usually receives enough money to avoid becoming destitute, but frequently does not
receive enough to fully compensate for the injury. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.50, at 11-12; Note,
supra note 5, at 185. Cf. Page, supra note 2, at 556 (benefits do not achieve an "equitable correlation"
with a worker's injury).
The less-than-full remedy was intended to keep down the costs of compensation, prevent fraud and
malingering, and create employee incentives for self-protection as an implicit substitute for assumption
of risk and contributory negligence. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.50, at 11-12; Epstein, The Historical
Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800-01 (1982).
15. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 (1986).
16. The exclusive remedy clause is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of
employees and employers are put in balance. While the employer assumes a new liability without fault,
the employer is also relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 65.11, at 12-1 to -6 (1983); Page, supra note 2, at 555-56.
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Finally, Congress envisioned the LHWCA as providing a mechanism to
spread the costs of industrial accidents from injured workers to consum-
ers. 17 Thus, the LHWCA requires employers to assure payment of compen-
sation under the Act, either by obtaining private compensation insurance or
by meeting the requirements of a self-insurer.18 The insurance premiums
can then be added into the costs of production and passed on to the
consumer with an increase in price. Since the insurer plays such a central
role in the compensation scheme, it "stands in the shoes" of the employer
under the LHWCA and may invoke the exclusive remedy clause as a
defense to a tort suit by an employee. 19
The exclusive remedy clause has been under increasing attack in recent
years. 20 As the likelihood of substantial tort recoveries rose significantly
beyond that available in the early 1900's,21 as administrative agencies
became more overworked, 22 and as legislatures failed to adjust compensa-
tion schemes to account for these changes, 23 injured employees have tried
to circumvent the exclusivity bar and sue outside the confines of the
compensation system.
B. Development of Judicial Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Rule
Injured employees have successfully urged courts to develop exceptions
to the exclusive remedy rule. Courts initially recognized a few limited
exceptions that allowed employees to sue employers directly.24 Courts also
17. In effect, legislatures saw industrial accidents as costs of production that should be reflected in
the price of the product causing the injury. 68 CONG. REC. 5412 (1927) (when introducing the LHWCA
bill. S3170, for passage. Rep. Underhill stated: "The original intent of all workmen's compensation
laws was to transfer from society and from the courts the expense of taking care of those injured in
industry and transfer it to the industry itself. -'): see also 68 CONG. REC. 5410 (1927) (statement of Rep.
Graham): A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.00, at 1-2, § 2.70, at 14; Note. supra note 5, at 183.
A corollary of this third policy is that safety in the workplace would be increased since employers
would seek to minimize costs of production by increasing safety and reducing workplace accidents.
Comment, supra note 3. at 1642.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 904, 932 (1986).
19. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 65. 11, at 12-5 n.3 (1983): Hughes v. Chitty, 283 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1969); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 935 (1986) (substitution
of the insurance carrier for the employer in order to discharge the obligation and duties of the employer
under the compensation act).
20. Epstein, supra note 14, at 776.
21. Page, supra note 2, at 556-57.
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23. Comment, supra note 3, at 1657.
24. These exceptions included the dual capacity doctrine, suits against parent and sibling corpora-
tions ofemployers, and actions based on fraud oran intentional tort committed by the employer. See, e.g..
Seide v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 169 Cal. App. 3d 985, 215 Cal. Rptr. 629,632 (1985) (recognizing an
intentional torts exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA); Flamm v. Bethlehem Steel
Co.. 185 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1959), aff'd, 202 N.Y.S.2d222 (1960) (recognizing fraud in terminating medical
benefits as an exception to the LHWCA's exclusive remedy provision); Comment. supra note 3. at 1648.
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have allowed employees to sue third parties, such as manufacturers, for
injuries covered by compensation.25
In the early 1970's, courts began to allow employees to aim their suits
not at the employer or third parties, but at the insurance carrier who
terminated or delayed compensation benefits without cause. 26 Insurers
naturally raised the exclusive remedy provision as a defense.
The first theory advanced by employees to pierce the insurer's ex-
clusivity shield focused on the newly developing tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. In 1976, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
compensation claimant alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress
was allowed to sue under this theory despite the exclusive remedy or
penalty provisions of the Alaska workers' compensation act. 27 This case
unleashed a flood of lawsuits against insurers.28 Most courts, however,
severely restricted this cause of action by requiring proof of deliberate
intent, outrageous conduct, and severe emotional distress before the ex-
clusivity principle would be shattered.2 9
As courts fenced in the emotional distress theory with limitations,
compensation claimants began looking for alternative theories to support a
suit against an insurer. A development in tort law outside the workers'
compensation system provided this new theory. In the late 1970's, courts
began recognizing a cause of action against insurers based on bad faith
claims practices in the settling of an insured's claim. 30 The bad faith theory
allowed claims against an insurer even when the insurer's conduct was not
outrageous. This theory appealed to injured employees because the stan-
dard of proof was not as stringent as that required for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 31
In 1979, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended the bad faith doctrine to
the workers' compensation context and allowed a compensation claimant to
25. See A. MiLLUS & W. GENTLE, supra note 2, at 48; Larson, Third Party Action Over Against
Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982 DuKE L.J. 483 (surveying case law).
26. Similar to many state compensation acts, the LHWCA allows an insurer to unilaterally
controvert or terminate the payment of benefits. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(a) (1986). The injured employee
must then either request an informal conference or file for a formal hearing before the Office of
Administrative Law Judges to resolve the dispute. Id. § 919(c), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 702.261-.273 (1986).
Resolution of the dispute may last up to a year or more. See supra note 3.
27. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds,
Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).
28. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.34(c), at 13-72 to -75 (1983).
29. Id. at 13-75 to -76.
30. Schuessler, First Party Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended to Workers' Compensation Cases?,
34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 199, 199 (1984) (and cases cited therein).
31. Although bad faith is labeled an intentional tort, the test for bad faith employs a negligence
standard of reasonableness and focuses on whether an. insurer had a reasonable basis upon which to
deny benefits. Id. at 201.
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sue an insurer for bad faith. 32 Just as the decision by the Alaska Supreme
Court unleashed a flood of suits alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court unleashed another
flood of lawsuits in the early 1980's alleging bad faith delay or nonpayment
of compensation benefits. 33
C. State Court Approaches to the Problem
State courts are divided into three main groups on the issues of whether
to allow actions against a compensation insurer for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or bad faith. The three approaches taken by the state
courts can, for simplicity's sake, be called the "Compensation approach,"
the "Limitation approach," and the "Compromise approach," depending
on which workers' compensation policies the particular approach im-
plicitly stresses.
1. The Compensation Approach
"Compensation courts" 34 focus on the policy of providing swift and
32. Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
33. Between 1980 and 1985, over 30 cases alleging bad faith delay by an insurance company or self-
insured employer reached the highest courts in 16 different jurisdictions.
34. State courts that currently allow actions for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and
bad faith include Colorado, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1276 (Colo. 1985): Connecticut,
Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (D. Conn. 1985) (interpreting Connecticut
law); Maine, Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 222-23 (Me. 1978); Maryland,
Gallagherv. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 303 Md. 201,492 A.2d 1280, 1281(1985) (holding that
the exclusive remedy clause does not bar a bad faith action, but dismissing the complaint since Maryland
does not recognize the tort of bad faith) and Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 303 Md. 182.492
A.2d 1270, 1278-79 (1985) (allowing action forintentional infliction of emotional distress);Mississippi,
McCain v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1001, 1002 (Miss. 1986) and Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55, 58-59 (Miss. 1984); Montana, Birkenbuel v. Montana State
Compensation Ins. Fund, 687 P.2d 700,703-04 (Mont. 1984) and Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 187
Mont. 148,609 P.2d 257,259,262 (1980); New York, DeMarco v. Federal Ins. Co., 99 A.D.2d 114.472
N.Y.S.2d 464, 466-67 (App. Div. 1984), cf Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co.. 63 N.Y.2d 412, 472
N.E.2d 682, 685, 482 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (App. Div. 1984) (barring action since conduct failed to
amount to outrageous conduct or bad faith); and South Dakota, Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.. 712
F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 1983) (interpreting South Dakota law). Many ofthese decisions address only
the bad faith issue. However, the rationales used by the courts encompass intentional infliction of
emotional distress as well.
Several other state court decisions appear to recognize both theories: Alaska, Stafford v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Alaska 1974) (penalties were not intended as the exclusive remedy for
intentional wrongdoing), overruled on other grounds. Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525
(Alaska 1976);Delaware, Correa v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 618 F. Supp. 915,922-25 (D. Del.
1985) (applying Delaware law, but relying on Compensation court decisions to hold that Delaware's
exclusive remedy provision does not baractions forbad faith or intentional infliction of emotional distress
where the insurer failed to pay workers' compensation medical benefits):Michigan. Broaddus v. Ferndale
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certain compensation to an injured employee, while maximizing an em-
ployee's recovery by allowing actions for both bad faith and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. These courts generally use a two-step
analysis to justify focusing on one policy to the exclusion of the other two.
First, the courts hold that the exclusive remedy clause does not apply to
actions based on intentional or bad faith conduct. 35 Then, the courts focus
on legislative intent to support their conclusion that the various statutory
penalties and remedies for delay or nonpayment of benefits are not intended
to be the exclusive remedy for insurer misconduct.
36
a. Avoiding the Exclusive Remedy Clause
Compensation courts generally use one of three rationales to avoid the
language of the exclusive remedy clause, all of which focus on the coverage
provisions of a workers' compensation statute. The basic premise of these
courts is that the workers' compensation statute is exclusive only if it covers
the injury sustained by the employee.37
The first rationale is that many compensation statutes apply only to
"personal injuries," language which is generally interpreted to cover
physical injuries. 38 Alleged injuries stemming from insurer misconduct,
however, are generally nonphysical, consisting primarily of emotional and
financial harm. 39 As a result, the courts conclude that the injuries are not
covered by the compensation act. 40
The second rationale is that compensation acts generally apply only to
injuries that occur within the scope of an employee's duties. 41 Injuries from
Fastener Div., 84 Mich. App. 593,269 N.W.2d 689,693 (1978) (relying on the nonphysical rationale to
allow an action against acompensation carrier); Pennsylvania, Reed v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
367F. Supp. 134,135-36 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Pennsylvania compensation act is nottheexclusiveremedy for
an insurer's intentional tort); and Texas, Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933-34 (Tex. 1983)
(reversing dismissal ofclaims forbad faith and intentional infliction ofemotional distress to allow plaintiff
to amend the complaint, sinceTexas allows a common law action foran intentional tort that is independent
of the original injury).
35. DeMarco v. Federal Ins. Co., 99 A.D.2d 114,472 N.Y.S.2d 464,466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
36. Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 187 Mont. 148,609 P.2d 257,262 (1980). Courts using the
Compensation approach generally treat cases dealing with intentional infliction of emotional distress and
bad faith as analogous. S. ASHLEY, BAD FArrH AcTIONS § 7:12, at 21 (1984).
37. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.40, at 12-25 to -26 (1983) ("[T]he employer should be
spared damage liability only whencompensation liability has actually been provided in its place .. ")
38. Broaddus v. Ferndale Fastener Div., 84 Mich. App. 593, 269 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1978).
39. Id. at 692.
40. Id. at 693.
41. The LHWCA covers injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(2) (1986). Courts interpret similar language to mean that workers' compensation substitutes for
tort recovery only if the employee's injuries have been caused by the ordinary risks of employment. Love,
supra note 2, at 874. Thus, the premise of the scope ofemployment rationale is that deliberate, intentional
injury by the employer or insurer is not one of these ordinary risks. Id.
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an insurer's misconduct are "separate and distinct" from the initial work-
related injury. 42 The employee seeks damages not as an injured employee,
but as a compensation claimant. 43
The third rationale focuses on the statutory language referring to "acci-
dental injuries." 44 Compensation courts argue that intentional infliction of
emotional distress and bad faith involve intentional rather than accidental
misconduct by an insurer and therefore do not fall within the coverage of the
compensation statutes or the exclusive remedy provisions. 45
b. Focusing on Legislative Intent to Avoid the Exclusivity of the
Statutory Penalties and Remedies
In the second step of their analysis, Compensation courts reject the
argument that statutory remedies for delay or nonpayment should be the
employee's exclusive remedy.46 Compensation courts usually look to legis-
lative intent, and then conclude that the legislature could not have intended
to preclude a common law tort action for insurer misconduct as a supple-
ment to the statutory remedies. 47
The courts advance two rationales in support of this assumption regard-
ing legislative intent, or, more precisely, the lack of legislative intent. First,
the statutory policy of swift and certain payment of compensation is
undercut when an insurer wrongfully delays or terminates payment. 48
Recognition of common law tort actions against an insurer will deter this
conduct and further the policy of compensation. 49 Thus, the legislature
could not have intended to allow insurers to frustrate this primary policy.50
Second, Compensation courts focus on the low level of penalties provided
in a compensation statute for delay or nonpayment of benefits. 5' The courts
42. Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 187 Mont. 148, 609 P.2d 257, 261 (1980); Coleman v.
American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615. 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (1979).
43. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 330-31 (1st Cir. 1974).
44. The LHWCA covers "accidental injury or death." 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(2) (1986).
45. Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1983) (interpreting South
Dakota law).
46. Compensation courts must make this second step since traditional compensation principles
hold that when a penalty has been built into the compensation act for any kind of employer conduct, the
boundaries of the general exclusivity principle are expanded to take in that conduct. 2A A. LARSON.
supra note 1. § 69.30, at 13-130 (1983).
47. See Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1978) (also noting that
the statutory penalty is payable to the state rather than the claimant).
48. Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981).
49. Schuessler, supra note 30, at 206.
50. See id.
51. Most statutes provide only a 10% or 20% penalty. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(c), (f) (1986).
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view these penalties, or any other statutory procedures, as basically inade-
quate to remedy intentional insurer misconduct.
52
2. The Limitation Approach
"Limitation courts" 53 focus on the policy of limiting an employer's
liability and providing an employee with adequate, but less-than-full,
compensation. These courts reject both the bad faith and emotional distress
theories, relegating the injured employees to any available statutory re-
medies. The rationale is that:
[T]he legislature, anticipating that bad faith in delaying payment of benefits
would occur on occasion, provided a quick, simple and readily accessible
method of resolving disputes over such payments without "the proof and
defenses incident [to a common law action], the intolerable delay in resolu-
tion of a lawsuit, economic waste to all and expense to the worker" . . . or
the spectre of "multiple jurisdictions being engaged in the resolution of the
same basic questions with the possibility of conflicting results."
54
52. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615,273 N.W.2d 220,224 (1979).
53. State courts that currently reject actions founded on bad faith or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress include Georgia, Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1984); contra
Brazier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 541,548 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (interpreting Georgia law priorto the
Bright decision);llinois, Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d 866,867,872 (1983)
and Hicks v. Board ofEduc., 77 Il. App. 3d 974, 397 N.E.2d 16,19-20 (1979) (the statutory penalties in
Illinois are more substantial than in other states, amounting to 50%); Kansas, Hormann v. New
Hampshirelns. Co., 236Kan. 190,689 P.2d 837, 843-44(1984);Minnesota, Denisenv. MilwaukeeMut.
Ins. Co., 360N.W.2d448,449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);NewMexico, Chavezv. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
547F.2d541,543 (I0thCir. 1977) and Escobedo v. American Employers Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 544, 544 (10th
Cir. 1977) (both interpreting New Mexico law), see also Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co.,
98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 3 (1982), and Gonzales v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 N.M. 432,659
P.2d 318, 320-21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Tennessee, Perry v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 703 S.W.2d 151,
151, 154-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); and Wisconsin, Jadofsky v. Iowa Kemper Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 2d 494,
355 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). Wisconsin initially recognized both torts, but the legislature
overruled Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615,273 N.W.2d 220 (1979), increased
the statutory penalty from 20% to 200%, and declared this penalty to be the exclusive remedy for wrongful
delay or nonpayment of benefits. Jadofsky v. Iowa Kemper Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 2d 494, 355 N.W.2d 550,
553 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984).
Several other state court decisions appear to bar both actions: Iowa, Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc.,
331 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 1983) (rejecting claim alleging intentional, outrageous conductby an employer
in refusing to provide medical benefits); Missouri, Young v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 588
S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to apply doctrine of bad faith to workers' compensation
claims); and South Carolina, Whitten v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470, 474-75
(D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1979) (dismissing complaint alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress since South Carolina does not recognize such a tort without accompanying
physical injury and since the penalties provide a full remedy).
54. Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d 866, 869-70 (1983).
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Thus, these courts interpret legislative intent to deny an employee any tort
suit against an insurer for injuries resulting from delay or nonpayment of
compensation. 55
3. The Compromise Approach
"Compromise courts" 56 implicitly focus on all three policies underlying
workers' compensation and refuse to disrupt the legislative bargain except
in cases of egregious misconduct. The various Compromise courts allow
actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress and reject actions for
bad faith, but use different rationales in reaching this result.
One Compromise court allows an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, relying on the arguments used by Compensation
courts, 57 but rejects the bad faith theory, relying on the rationale employed
by Limitation courts. 58 The court distinguishes intentional infliction of
emotional distress from bad faith by focusing on the proof required to state
a cause of action. 59 The court concludes that only the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress meets the standard of egregious cruelty or
venality needed to shatter the exclusivity principle. 60
55. Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 236 Kan. 190, 689 P.2d 837,844 (1984).
56. Only two state courts currently allow actions based on outrageous conduct or intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, while denying actions based on bad faith: California, Unruh v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616,498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972); andAlabama, Selfv. Bennett, 474 So. 2d
673,673 (Ala. 1985), Moorev. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 122,122 (Ala. 1985), Bearden v. Equifax
Servs., 455 So. 2d 836, 836-37 (Ala. 1984), Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80, 82-83 (Ala. 1983), and
Waldon v. Hartford Ins. Group, 435 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Ala. 1983).
Some other decisions suggest that two additional state courts may also follow the Compromise
approach: Arizona, Hixon v. State Compensation Fund, 115 Ariz. 392, 565 P.2d 898, 899-900 (1977)
(dismissing complaint because bare allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress fails to state a
claim for relief under Arizona law, which requires outrageous and extreme conduct), and Sandoval v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & PowerDist., 117 Ariz. 209,571 P.2d706, 711 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(rejecting action against an insurer for negligence or intentional deprivation of benefits, but noting that the
holding does not preclude an Unruh-type action); and Florida, Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442
So. 2d 1078, 1079, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting bad faith action, but noting that the conduct
alleged was not sufficiently outrageous or deliberate to fall within the intentional tort exception).
57. The Alabama court focuses on the rationale that an intentional, outrageous act is not within an
employee's scope ofemployment, nor is it accidental. Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80, 83 (Ala. 1983).
58. The Alabama court focuses on the rationale that a bad faith action would circumvent the policy
and remedies of the compensation act. Waldon v. Hartford Ins. Group, 435 So. 2d 1271, 1273-74 (Ala.
1983).
59. Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80, 83 (Ala. 1983). Intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires proof of outrageous conduct on the part of the insurer, and resulting severe emotional injury. Id.
This is a much heavier burden of proof than that undera bad faith theory, where a plaintiff need only show
unreasonable conduct. Schuessler, supra note 30, at 201.
60. Garvin v. Shewbart. 442 So. 2d 80. 82-83 (Ala. 1983); see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 68.34(c), at 13-76 (1983).
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Other Compromise courts, rather than focusing on the standard of proof,
use the "dual capacity" doctrine to allow a compensation claimant to sue
an insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 61 However, these
courts reject any attempt to sue an insurer for bad faith delay or nonpayment
of compensation benefits. 62 The rationale used to deny bad faith actions is
similar to that used by Limitation courts. 63
D. The LHWCA Cases
Recently, an apparent conflict has developed in the federal courts over
whether the penalty provisions of the LHWCA provide the exclusive
remedy for insurer misconduct that amounts to intentional infliction of
emotional distress or bad faith.
1. Approach Taken by the First Circuit
In 1974, the First Circuit held that the exclusive remedy and penalty
provisions of the LHWCA did not bar a state law action against an insurer
for intentional infliction of emotional distress in terminating compensation
payments. 64 The court advanced several reasons in support of its decision to
61. Unruhv. TruckIns. Exch., 7Cal. 3d616,498 P.2d 1063, 102Cal. Rptr. 815(1972). In Unruh, the
California Supreme Court held that when an insurerengages in outrageous conduct, the insurer "steps out
of the shoes" of the employer and is no longerprotected by the exclusive remedy clause. 498 P.2d at 1073,
102 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
62. California appellate courts have consistently required proof of fraudulent, deceitful, outrageous,
or perfidious conduct by the insurer. Mere allegations of bad faith delay in payment do not constitute
sufficiently outrageous conduct to shatterthe exclusivity bar. Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 168
Cal. App. 3d 898, 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 681-82 (1985); see also Love, supra note 2, at 891 n.280 (citing
additional cases). Even allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress, without more, are not
sufficient. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 763,189 Cal. Rptr. 761,762-63,
768 (1983) (dismissing action even though plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Rather, thecomplaint mustcontain allegations ofspecific conduct deemed tobeoutrageous orfraudulent.
Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15,171 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165 (1981). Cf. Dill v.
Claims Admin. Servs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1184,224 Cal. Rptr. 273,275-76 (1986) (holding that Califor-
nia's exclusive remedy provision does not bar an employee's action against an independent claims
administratorof a self-insured employer, when the employee alleges intentional failure topay benefits but
notoutrageous conduct). Contra Denning v. Esis Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d946, 189 Cal. Rptr. 118, 119-20
(1983); Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 168 Cal. App. 3d 898,214 Cal. Rptr. 679,683-85 (1985).
63. These courts argue that the legislature has provided a remedy, the remedy avoids the delay
associated with litigation, and to allow suchsuits would result in a partial disintegration of the workers'
compensation system. Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15,171 Cal. Rptr. 164,
166(1981).
64. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (lst Cir. 1974). The plaintiff in the case was an injured
longshoreman who had received three checks from Travelers Insurance Company totalling $5700 in
settlement of his workers' compensation claim. Two weeks after the employee deposited the checks and
began making withdrawals on them, the insurer stopped payment on the checks and filed an appeal of the
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allow a state law action outside the LHWCA, many of which parallel the
rationales used by Compensation courts. 65 The First Circuit's reasoning has
been cited and relied on extensively by Compensation courts in creating a
bad faith exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the particular
workers' compensation act. 66
2. Approach Taken by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas
In 1985, a federal district court in the Fifth Circuit held that the LHWCA
preempts state law whenever a cause of action is based on the mishandling
or termination of LHWCA compensation payments. 67 The Eastern District
of Texas used rationales similar to those used by Limitation courts and held
that the LHWCA is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, includ-
ing injuries resulting from bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 68 The district court also explicitly refused to follow the First
Circuit's decision. 69
administrative agency's decision. This conduct allegedly violated section 914(f) of the LHWCA, making
the insurer liable for a 20% penalty under the LHWCA.
The complaint alleged that the insurer's actions violated the terms of the LHWCA and had subjected the
employee to financial embarrassment since he had written checks that had become worthless. The
complaint also alleged that the insurer should have known that the employee had a "grievous and life-
threatening disease" which could be aggravated by the insurer's actions into another "disabling attack"
and severe physical impairment. Id. at 330. The First Circuit ultimately remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the insurer's actions constituted a tort under state law. Id. at 33 1.
65. For instance, the First Circuit reasoned that the intentional acts of the insurer were not within the
scope of the longshoreman's employment. Id. at 330-31.
66. Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220, 223-24 (1979):
Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 222-23 (Me. 1978).
67. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tex. 1985). The injured
employee had received temporarytotal disability benefits from the compensation insurer. In Septemberof
1983, the insurer terminated payments in accordance with the provisions of the LHWCA after the
employee was examined by a physician of his own choice. The employee appealed and, on September 14.
1984, nearly one year later, won an award of compensation, attorneys' fees, and interest on any unpaid
compensation. Id. at 1318.
The employee then filed an action in state court alleging several causes of action, including bad faith
claims practices underTexas law and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response, the insurer
filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court seekingtoenjoin the employee from pursuing his state
court action. The district court granted the injunction. Id. at 1318-19, 1324.
68. Id. at 1319-20.
69. Id. at 1321-22. The district court initially focused on three preemption doctrines. The court
reasoned that the LHWCA preempted state law for three reasons. First, Congress expressly preempted
state law by providing, tn 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 (1986), that the LHWCA is the employees' exclusive
remedy. Texas Employers, 618 F. Supp. at 1319. Second. Congress' intent to supersede state law may be
inferred because the LHWCA is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for states to supplement it. Id. Third, allowing state law actions would stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. including the desire for
uniformity and for avoiding litigation. Id. at 1319-20.
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3. Approach Taken by the Ninth Circuit
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit held that the LHWCA bars an action for bad
faith termination of benefits. 70 The Ninth Circuit rationale is somewhat
obscure and it is not clear whether the court would adopt the Limitation
approach or the Compromise approach. 71 However, the court distinguished
the First Circuit decision as a case involving "conspicuously con-
temptible" facts.72 This distinction leaves open the possibility that the
Thecourt also reliedon two recentSupreme Courtdecisions. InAllis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985), the Supreme Court held that a state law requirement of good faith in payments of compensation
may not be used to expand the applicable laborrelations law governing contracts and that the state law was
preempted by federal law. Second, the district courtrelied on Shaw v. Delta AirLines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85
(1983), where the Supreme Court held that New York's Human Rights law was preempted to the extent
that it prohibited practices that were lawful under federal law. Texas Employers, 618 F. Supp. at 1320.
In addition, the district court relied on a "but for" rationale to conclude that the LHWCA should be an
employee's exclusive remedy. The court stated:
In the present case, the violations alleged are rooted in federal compensation law. But for the federal
compensation law, there could be no mishandling of the claim since there could be no claim.
. . . There can be no escaping the conclusion that except for the federally created rights and duties
there could be no mishandling of compensation. Since the right to compensation comes from the
LHWCA, the right to damages for mishandling the compensation also arises from the Act.
Id. at 1320-21.
70. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1206 (1986).
Unlike the plaintiffs in the First Circuit and Eastern District of Texas cases, who were pursuing actions
based on state law, the longshoremen in this case sought to bring an action for bad faith under federal
maritime law. Id. at 1343-44.
The longshoremen also brought an action against the Office of Workers' Compensation seeking a
prospective injunction to, in effect, speed up the handling of disputed claims and reduce the admin-
istrative hearing delay from over nine months to twenty days. The Ninth Circuit mooted this claim and
failed to reach it. Id. at 1343.
71. The opinion is unclear for several reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the
LHWCA's exclusive remedy and penalty provisions merely provided support for the court's decision to
reject a federal bad faith action. Id. at 1346. The court did not decide the issue of whether the LHWCA
would also bar an action for bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional distress based on state law.
Second, assuming the Ninth Circuit would extend its rationale to actions based on state law, the
opinion's rationale is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be read to bar both bad faith and emotional
distress actions. Although noting that federal courts have recognized an "intentional tort" exception to
theLHWCA, id. at 1346-47, thecourtcontinued: "Even ifthe exclusivity provision ofthe LHWCA isnot
read to bar the putative cause of action for wrongful refusal to pay, the penalty provision should serve the
same purpose." Id. at 1347.
This statement is similar to those made by Limitation courts in denying both bad faith and emotional
distress actions. See Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 236 Kan. 190, 689 P.2d 837,843-44 (1984)
(holding that the penalty provision in the Kansas compensation act bars an action for intentional nonpay-
ment of benefits, even though the exclusive remedy clause itself does not). Thus, the Sample opinion
could mean the Ninth Circuit adopts the Limitation approach.
"On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit opinion suggests that the court may have adopted the Compromise
approach. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. Sample, 771 F.2d at 1347. The court noted thatthe plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to
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Ninth Circuit could still adopt the Compromise approach, rejecting bad
faith actions while allowing actions based on outrageous conduct.
II. ANALYSIS
It appears the First Circuit has adopted the Compensation approach, the
Eastern District of Texas has adopted the Limitation approach, and the
Ninth Circuit may adopt either the Limitation approach or the Compromise
approach.
In order to assist federal court decisionmaking, the following analysis
will make three points. First, the Compensation and Limitation approaches
do not adequately address the policies underlying the LHWCA. Second,
the federal courts should adopt the Compromise approach since it best
furthers the LHWCA policies. In addition, a proper reading of the three
federal opinions demonstrates that the courts, rather than taking inconsis-
tent approaches, have implicitly adopted the Compromise approach. Third,
the LHWCA is not sufficiently out-of-date to require a court to update the
statute by creating a bad faith exception to the Act.
A. The Compensation and Limitation Approaches Are Inadequate
1. The Compensation Approach
The two-step analysis 73 used by Compensation courts and the First
Circuit to justify focusing exclusively on the policy of compensating
injured employees is inadequate. The rationales 74 used in the first step to
avoid the exclusive remedy clause fail to provide a principled basis for
allowing actions for bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional distress
under the LHWCA. In the second step, while the legislative intent rationale
used by Compensation courts to avoid the exclusivity defense may provide
a sound basis for allowing an action based on outrageous conduct, the
justification does not provide a principled basis for allowing an action for
bad faith. The proper approach should consider all of the policies underly-
ing the LHWCA.
state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, impliedly characterizing the facts in
Sample as involving "'ordinary refusal to pay." Id.
73. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
74. The three rationales used in the first step of the analysis to avoid the coverage provisions of the
compensation act and the exclusive remedy provision are (1) the nonphysical rationale, (2) the scope of
employment rationale, and (3) the accidental injury rationale. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
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a. The Nonphysical Rationale
The nonphysical rationale is based on the premise that nonphysical
injuries like emotional distress are not compensable under a workers'
compensation statute; thus, the exclusive remedy provision does not ap-
ply.75 However, the rationale fails to provide satisfactory reasons for allow-
ing either an emotional distress or bad faith action outside the LHWCA.
First, the rationale has no textual basis in the LHWCA's coverage provi-
sion. 76 Second, the rationale's premise fails under the LHWCA, a statute
which does in fact provide a remedy for mental or nonphysical injuries. 77
Third, as a practical matter, the nonphysical test is too imprecise to be used
successfully by the courts. 78
b. The Scope of Employment Rationale
The scope of employment rationale, while it may provide a sound basis
for allowing actions based on outrageous conduct, fails to provide a
principled basis for also allowing a bad faith action. Compensation courts
support this rationale by arguing that intentional acts of an insurer in
delaying or terminating benefits are "separate and distinct" from the
original work-related injury.79 However, this merely assumes a conclusion.
Negligence following an initial injury is frequently considered part of the
original injury. 80 Even though bad faith is technically considered an "inten-
tional tort," the test for bad faith focuses on the reasonableness of an
75. Love, supra note 2, at 870-71.
76. The LHWCA covers disability or death resulting from "an injury." 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a)
(1986). Injury is defined as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and
such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or
unavoidably results from such accidental injury .... "Id. § 902(2). Thus, the LHWCA does not use
the word "personal" or "physical" to define the word "injury" for coverage purposes.
The result would be the same in most states since many state compensation statutes have been amended
in recent years to cover "accidental injury" ratherthan "personal injury." This change in language, which
was intended to expand compensation coverage to include occupational diseases, effectively destroys the
textual basis for the nonphysical rationale in state acts as well. See Love, supra note 2, at 870-71.
77. See, e.g., Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1206
(1986) (one longshoreman received compensation for "mental health sequelae").
78. ProfessorLarson acknowledges that distinguishing between physical and nonphysical injuries is
exceptionally difficult, especially when an employee sustains both physical and nonphysical injuries. 2A
A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.30, at 13-40 (1983). He suggests a test that would focus on the essence of
the tortindecidingwhethertoallowtheemployee to sueoutside thecompensationsystem. Id. § 68.34(a),
at 13-62 to -63 (1983). However, this test has been criticized as leading to unjust results. Love, supra note
2, at 888-89.
79. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
80. For instance, a plaintiffcan recoverfrom a negligent automobile driverforinjuries sustained after
the accident from medical malpractice. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 44, at 309-10.
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insurer's conduct. 81 Reasonableness is primarily a negligence inquiry.82
Thus, it is not self-evident that unreasonable, bad faith conduct is separate
and distinct from the original workplace injury. Moreover, even intentional
acts are not always separate and distinct from the original injury.83 The
issue is one of foreseeability. 84 Compensation courts have failed to supply
any reasons why a subsequent intentional act by an insurer is or is not a
foreseeable consequence of the original injury. The proper focus of a
court's analysis should not be on the intentional nature of the tort since
some intentional injuries are foreseeable. Rather, courts should concen-
trate on the outrageous nature of the insurer's conduct. The more out-
rageous an insurer's conduct, and the more harm that results, the more
likely that the subsequent injury will be separate and distinct from the
original injury.85
c. The Accidental Injury Rationale
Probably the most persuasive rationale for avoiding the exclusive remedy
clause in both emotional distress and bad faith cases is the "accidental
injury" rationale. 86 The premise of the accidental injury rationale is that an
insurer cannot commit an intentional act and later claim that the act was
accidental and thus limit an employee to compensation benefits. 87
81. Schuessler, supra note 30, at 201.
82. Id. Negligence is defined as conduct which "involves an unreasonably great risk of causing
damage" or which "falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against an
unreasonable risk of harm." PROSSER, supra note 5, § 31. at 169.
83. For instance, when a landlord's negligence in failing to provide adequate security measures foran
apartment building results in intentional, criminal attacks upon a tenant, courts have held the landlord
responsible if the attacks were reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp.. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding a landlord liable for foreseeable criminal acts);Johnston v.
Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) (holding a landlord liable for an assault upon a tenant
where the assailant lurked in the poorly lighted and unlocked vestibule ofthe landlord's apartment house).
84. The LHWCA uses the phrase "naturally or unavoidably." 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(2) (1986). The
inquiry is essentially the same. Rather than focusing on foreseeability, a court interpreting the LHWCA
would focus on whether the intentional bad faith conduct was a natural orunavoidable result ofthe original
injury.
Many state compensation acts reject the foreseeability notion and adopt a "positional-risk" test, under
which an injury is compensable if it would not have happened but for the claimant's employment. A.
LARSON, supra note I, § 6.00; Page, supra note 2, at 561 (arguing that even if the risks are unforeseeable.
an intentional tort may still be compensable if the employment in fact exposed the employee to those
risks). This test makes it even more difficult to argue that subsequent bad faith conduct is a separate and
distinct injury.
85. Cf Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329,331 (IstCir. 1974) (an insurer'scallousstoppingof
payment is a separate tort).
86 Professor Larson endorses this rationale as the most satisfactory. 2A A. LARSON, supra note I.
§ 68. 11, at 13-4 (1983) (labeling this rationale the "nonaccidental theory").
87. Id. § 68.00; Note. supra note 5, at 191 (it is anomalous to allow an employer to categorize as an
accident an injury that the employer intentionally inflicted on an employee).
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Again, however, while the rationale may cover outrageous conduct, it
should not, without more, extend to cover bad faith acts. If the accidental
injury rationale were read broadly, it would encompass all technical inten-
tional torts and lead to illogical results and disintegration of the compensa-
tion system. 88
In any event, since the penalty provisions of the LHWCA apply whether
or not the delay or nonpayment is accidental, 89 Compensation courts must
go beyond the accidental injury rationale to allow an employee to sue for
either bad faith or emotional distress outside the LHWCA.
The two rationales90 used by Compensation courts in the second step of
their analysis are unpersuasive. The first rationale is contradictory. While
the rationale furthers the policy of compensating the injured employee by
providing for recovery of additional tort benefits, it actually undercuts the
policy of swift and certain payment. The essence of the latter policy is the
avoidance of the delays and costs associated with tort litigation. 9' Allowing
88. For instance, intentional torts include notonly intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad
faith, but also battery and assault. Battery is a "harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from
an act intendedto cause. . . such contact." PROssER, supra note5, § 9, at 39 (emphasis added). Assault
is an act intendedto arouse apprehensionofimminent physical injury orbattery. Id. § 10, at46. Allowing
suits forslight injuries that are only technically considered intentional would result in the disintegration of
the compensation system. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 814 (noting that indirect erosion of the compensa-
tion system occurs when the intent requirement is attenuated).
To prevent this disintegration, most federal and state courts require a plaintiff to show "deliberate
intent" in orderto state aclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d
1335, 1346(9thCir. 1985), cert. denied, 106S. Ct. 1206(1986);seeHoustonv. BechtelAss'nProfessional
Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (D.D.C. 1981) ("nothing short of specific intent to injure the employee
falls outside the scope of § 905(a)"); see also Comment, supra note 3, at 1658-59.
However, only one state court has applied the same deliberate intent requirement to a bad faith action.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275-76 (Colo. 1985) (defining deliberate intent to require
proof of knowledge by the insurer that its conduct is unreasonable, or reckless disregard by the insurer of
the fact that the conduct is unreasonable). In Colorado, the accidental injury rationale does provide a
principled basis for avoiding the exclusive remedy provision in both emotional distress and bad faith
cases. If the federal courts require an LHWCA plaintiff to prove deliberate intent in a bad faith action, use
of the accidental injury rationale would probably not result in attenuation of the intent requirement.
89. TexasEmployerslns. Ass'nv. Jackson, 618F RSupp. 1316,1320(E.D.Tex. 1985) (goodfaithdoes
not play a part in the LHWCA penalty provisions). The LHWCA penalty provisions assess a 10% or 20%
penalty whenever compensation is not paid within the prescribed time limits. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(e)
(1986) (in the case of compensation due without an award, the time limit is 14 days after compensation
becomes due); id. § 914(f) (in the case of compensation due with an award, the time limit is 10 days after
compensation becomes due). See supra note 12. There is no requirement that the failure to pay be
accidental. See also Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37,43 (Alaska 1974) (interpreting the
penalty provisions of a statute similar to LHWCA to cover both intentional and negligent delay in
payment), overruled on other grounds, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).
90. The first rationale infers legislative intent from the policy of swift and certain payment and the
policy of compensation underlying the LHWCA. The second rationale infers legislative intent by
focusing on the low level of the penalty awards. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
91. After administrative costs and claimants' attorneys' fees have been accounted for, half of the
workers' compensation premium dollar goes to workers. In contrast, only 30% to 40% of the premium
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bad faith actions undercuts this goal by injecting a tort action into the
LHWCA scheme. In any event, it seems rather presumptuous to argue that
replacing a one year administrative delay with a two, three, or four year
court case will result in quicker or speedier payment of compensation.
The second rationale is unpersuasive because it fails to consider all the
policies underlying the LHWCA. While the rationale may be persuasive
when focusing solely on the legislative policies of prompt payment and
compensating an injured employee, the rationale ignores the policy of
limiting an employer's liability and providing an employee with less-than-
full compensation. Although a ten or twenty percent penalty may not
always fully compensate an employee for the injury, this alone does not
justify avoiding the legislative scheme, especially when the scheme ex-
pressly fails to provide full compensation in other areas. The most satisfac-
tory approach should consider all the policies underlying the LHWCA.
2. The Limitation Approach
The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and Limitation
courts generally, defer to Congress or the state legislature if the compensa-
tion statute covers the particular injury alleged. 92 Limitation courts focus
exclusively on the policy of limiting an employer's liability to that provided
in the statute and adopt a "but for" analysis. 93 This analysis is inadequate
primarily because it is too broad. Taken to its logical conclusion, it would
allow insurers to engage in any tortious conduct, no matter how extreme or
outrageous, yet be subject, at worst, to limited statutory remedies. 94 In light
of the policy of compensation underlying the LHWCA, this result is not
justified. Limitation courts focus on the policy of limiting an employer's
liability, but ignore the other policies of compensating an injured employee
and providing prompt payment. 95
dollargoes to workers under tort law. Comment, supra note 3, at 1652 n.73 (arguing that this difference is
outweighed by enhancing workplace safety).
92. Id. at 1654.
93. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316, 1320-21 (E.D. Tex 1985)
(reasoning that "but for" the LHWCA, there would be no compensation payments and no delay in those
payments).
94. For instance, an insurer could pay an injured employee compensation, then later beat up the
employee, steal the check, and, in effect, wrongfully terminate payment of compensation. Under this
"but for" analysis, the insurer would only be liable for the statutory remedies of attorneys' fees. interest.
and a 20% penalty. Congress could not have intended such preposterous results. See 2A A. LARSON. supra
note 1, § 68.34(b), at 13-69 to -70 (1983) ("Plainly the existence of a compensation claim does not give
insurers or employers a blanket exemption from the entire law of tort. ").
95. A possible argument could be made that a dividing line should be drawn between criminal and
noncriminal conduct, ratherthan between unreasonable, bad faith conduct and outrageous conduct as this
Comment suggests. But this division is unpersuasive forseveral reasons. First, the right ofprosecution in a
criminal case lies with the state and not with the injured employee. It is unfair to relegate an employee to
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B. The Compromise Approach Should Be Followed by Courts
Interpreting the LHWCA
1. The Compromise Approach Best Furthers the Policies Underlying
the LHWCA
The Compensation, Limitation, and Compromise approaches all ulti-
mately rely on an interpretation of legislative intent to support their
contradictory positions. The statutory provisions involved are frequently
very similar, yet the courts following the three different approaches essen-
tially interpret similar legislative intent in three different ways.96 Courts
faced with the decision in the context of the LHWCA must therefore decide
which of the three interpretations of "legislative intent" is correct.
The Compromise approach provides a middle ground between the Com-
pensation and Limitation approaches, and yields the best interpretation of
"legislative intent" by focusing on and balancing all the policies underly-
ing the LHWCA. The Compromise approach best furthers all the policies
underlying the LHWCA. First, the Compromise approach furthers the
policy of compensating an injured employee by allowing actions against an
insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. When an employee
suffers serious injury97 from an unscrupulous insurer, the employee has a
remedy outside the compensation act, which supplements the remedies and
penalties already provided under the LHWCA.
Second, the Compromise approach furthers the policies of limiting an
employer's liability and avoiding litigation by rejecting actions based on
bad faith. A bad faith claim is easier to allege and easier to prove than an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.98 By rejecting bad
the vagaries of the criminal justice system, where a case may not be pursued for any one of a number of
reasons unrelated to the employee, such as lack of state resources, insufficient evidence, or inadequate
state counsel. In addition, the standard of proof in a criminal case is higher than in a civil case, making it
more difficult to reach egregious insurer misconduct like that in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616,
498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (insurance adjuster feigned romantic involvement with the
claimant causing emotional distress).
96. For instance, the Georgia workers' compensation statute was recently challenged by two dif-
ferent claimants, one in state court and one in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Both claimants'
actions sought damages for bad faith conduct by a compensation insurer. Interpreting the same statute
with reference to practically the same factual allegations, the courts reached opposite results. The federal
court adopted the Compensation approach and allowed the action to proceed. Brazier v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 602F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ga. 1984). TheGeorgiaSupreme Court adoptedtheLimitation approach and
dismissed the action. Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984).
97. Under this analysis, the employee must prove the state law elements of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. For instance, in Alabama a plaintiffmust prove extreme and outrageous conduct
that intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. The conduct must be so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society. Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80, 83 (Ala. 1983).
98. Schuessler, supra note 30, at 201. Contra J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8878.55, at 451 (1981).
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faith actions, a court reduces potential litigation and also reduces an
employer's potential liability.
Finally, the LHWCA is a system intended to fairly allocate the risks of
industrial life between consumers and injured employees. 99 Conduct that is
essentially negligent, and thus clearly within the foreseeable risks of indus-
trial life, should fall within the confines of the LHWCA scheme, while
conduct that goes far beyond negligence, and is clearly not a foreseeable risk,
should fall outside the LHWCA. Actions for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress require proof of outrageous and intentional conduct and
should not be covered by the LHWCA exclusivity principle. Bad faith
conduct, on the other hand, is judged on a standard of reasonableness or
negligence and should be handled within the LHWCA system. An approach
that balances the interests of both parties, allows some recovery, and focuses
on the basic thrust of compensation law furthers the policies of the LHWCA
better than an approach which focuses exclusively on one interest. 100
The Compromise approach is also best from a practical perspective. The
Compensation approach is unfair to the employer and its insurer because it
puts the insurance adjuster in a difficult bargaining position. Threats of bad
faith lawsuits would force an insurer to settle an employee's meritless claim
in order to avoid the legal costs of a bad faith lawsuit. 10 1
On the other hand, the Limitation approach, which allows no suits at all,
puts the employee in an unfair bargaining position. The long gaps between
termination of a disputed claim and administrative resolution of the dispute
give the insurer a tremendous financial and emotional weapon with which
to force the employee to settle a claim for less than that to which the
employee would be entitled under the compensation laws. 102 An employee
needs some recourse against the truly unscrupulous insurer.
99. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100. 130 CONG. REc. S 11,622 (dailyed. Sept. 20, 1984) (statementofSen. Hatch that interpretations
of the LHWCA by courts and the Department of Labor should reach results in keeping with the congres-
sional intent and purpose and that do not disrupt the consensus reached between employer and employee
interest groups).
101. Because of the reasonableness standard of proof in a bad faith action, almost any delay in
payment could provide grounds initially to state a claim for bad faith. Schuessler, supra note 30, at 210.
Moreover, an employee often has a good faith belief that he or she should get more compensation. Add to
this an attorney's duty to vigorously represent his or her client, and the impetus for a bad faith suit arises.
even if the recovery is only a payment by the insurer to get rid of the "nuisance" claim. This is not how the
compensation system was intended to function. Cf Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 187 Mont. 148,609
P.2d 257, 262-63 (1980) (Harrison, J., specially concurring).
102. The financial disadvantage is mitigated to some extent if the employee has outside sources of
income, such as union, welfare, social security or unemployment benefits, or personal insurance. But to
the extent an employee is still emotionally upset by the insurer's actions, the weapon remains. Also, the
goal of workers' compensation was to provide an employee with sufficient benefits so he or she would not
have to rely on the government for support. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.50. at 11-12; Note, supra note 5,
at 185.
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The Compromise approach is more equitable. While the threat of suit is
still present, the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim are much more difficult to prove103 and would be more easily
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, hence reducing the nuisance
value of the suit. In addition, the Compromise approach provides the
employee with some recourse against an unscrupulous insurer by allowing
actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This approach bal-
ances the interests of the employee and employer, and provides a con-
ceptual framework most consistent with the compromise between these
competing interests that underlies the LHWCA.
2. A Narrow Reading of the Decisions Interpreting the LHWCA
Suggests That the Federal Courts Have Adopted the Compromise
Approach
The apparent conflict in the federal courts' 04 over whether the penalty
provisions and other statutory remedies available under the LHWCA for
wrongful delay or termination of compensation should be the employee's
exclusive remedy can be reconciled by a narrow reading of the opinions.
Taken as a whole, the opinions should be read as adopting the Compromise
approach.
The First Circuit'0 5 relied on rationales used by Compensation courts to
avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the LHWCA. This decision,
although it uses broad language similar to that employed by Compensation
courts, should be read only to allow a state law action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The court did not reach the issue of bad
faith.
103. This Comment envisions that a plaintiff would have to allege specific acts ofoutrageous conduct
and deliberate intent to injure the employee in order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Mere allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct, or fraud
without supporting facts would not avoid the exclusivity bar.
California courts require a plaintiff to plead specific outrageous acts, and consistently reject claims
relying on conclusory language. Palmerv. R.L. Kautz & Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 155, 190 Cal. Rptr. 139,
145 (1983), appeal dismissedper stipulation oftheparties; see also Everfield v. State Compensation Ins.
Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15,20,171 Cal. Rptr. 164,166(1981) ("a complaint which does notcontain factual
allegations identifying the particular acts or circumstances which distinguish the tort of outrageous
conduct from an ordinary nonperformance of a statutory duty owed by respondent to appellant is
insufficient").
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, only require notice pleading, and do not require that a
plaintiff allege specific facts in the complaint. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 8. Thus, a motion for summary
judgment is needed in the federal system to dismiss a complaint forfailure to allege facts specific enough
to support a claim foroutrageous conduct. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 56; see also FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 12(b)
(allowing a motion to dismiss to be converted into a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the
pleadings are presented to the court).
104. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text..
105. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (Ist Cir. 1974).
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While the opinion began with the usual Compensation rationales,1 06
these justifications fail to address the issue of whether the LHWCA provi-
sions for penalties, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest should be the
longshoreman's exclusive remedy when there has been a wrongful delay or
termination in payment of compensation. In addressing this issue, the court
clarified the true basis for its decision. The court focused on the outrageous
conduct of the insurer:
But seemingly the crux of the complaint here is the insurer's callous
stopping of payment without warning when it should have realized that acute
harm might follow .... [W]e are satisfied that plaintiffs are not precluded
by the terms of the [LHWCA] from pursuing whatever independent remedy
may be recognized for such conduct. 107
The use of the words "callous," "such conduct," "without warning," and
"acute harm" indicate that the court was primarily disturbed by the
insurer's outrageous conduct and the resulting severe injury. The opinion
did not turn on whether the conduct was intentional, or whether the
longshoreman's employment had terminated. Rather, the First Circuit
concluded that the penalty provisions were not the exclusive remedy for
actions based on outrageous conduct by an insurer. 108
The focus of the decision, then, is not the accidental injury or scope of
employment rationales used by Compensation courts, but the outrageous,
callous conduct of the insurer and the acute harm that resulted from this
misconduct. Because of this perspective, the First Circuit decision does not
provide sound precedent for allowing a bad faith cause of action, which
focuses on reasonableness and does not require outrageous conduct. Thus,
the case stands for the proposition that insurers who engage in outrageous
conduct that causes severe injury are not protected by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the LHWCA.
While the First Circuit decision applies to claims based on outrageous,
callous insurer conduct, the decision by the Eastern District of Texas
applies to claims for bad faith conduct. 109 Although the complaint in the
district court case alleged both bad faith and intentional infliction of
106. The First Circuit used the typical scope ofemployment rationale. Id. at 330-31. In addition, the
court used a statutory rationale relying on the relation between the LHWCA sections, id. at 330. but this
rationale has little merit and disregards the usual method of reading penalty provisions to expand the
coverage provisions of the compensation act involved. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note I, § 69.30, at
13-130 (1983).
107. Martin, 497 .2d at 331.
108. In a footnote the court mentioned that the plaintiff had relied on the state law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional suffering. Id. at 331 n. 1.
109. Texas Employers Ins. Assn v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
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emotional distress as theories of recovery, the court's opinion focused
exclusively on the bad faith theory.110
Moreover, several of the preemption rationales11' used by the district
court lose considerable force if extended to include outrageous conduct by
the insurer as well as bad faith conduct. One of the court's principal
preemption arguments was that recognition of the bad faith action would be
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 112 One of the objectives stated was the protection of
the employer and carrier from tort suits. The court suggested that this
protection would be lost if longshoremen could sue the insurer for mishan-
dling of claims. This rationale, if read broadly to encompass outrageous
conduct as well, yields absurd "but for" results. 113
In addition, the district court's opinion relied heavily on a Supreme
Court case' 14 which held that state law requiring good faith payment of
compensation may not be used to expand the applicable labor relations law
governing contracts since the federal law preempted state law. 115 While this
precedent may support the conclusion that bad faith actions should not be
allowed, it does not mandate the same result for actions founded on
outrageous conduct. 116
110. Thetrue focus forthe decision becomes apparent fromthecourt's statement: "This court adopts
the position that the LHWCA has pre-empted state law regarding actions for bad faith handling of
LHWCA claims." Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). The district court nowhere in its opinion discusses the
different standards of conduct required for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad faith. After
initially noting in its statement of facts that the longshoreman alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the district court never mentioned the tort again.
11I. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
112. Texas Employers, 618 F Supp. at 1319.
113. Id. at 1320. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
114. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
115. See Texas Employers, 618 F. Supp. at 1320.
116. Other United States Supreme Court opinions, which deal with the issue of whether a federal
statute creates a private right of action, do not apply to the issue addressed in this Comment. The issue
presented in those cases was whether to create a federal action based on a federal statute which did not
provide for such a federal remedy. See, e.g., Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)
(refusing to allow a plaintiff to supplement her remedies under the Death on the High Seas Act with
additional remedies available under the general maritime law). The issue presented here is whether a
federal statute prevents a claimant from pursuing existing state law actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and bad faith. Cf Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106S.
Ct. 1206 (1986) (plaintiffs asked the court to create a federal bad faith action under the general maritime
law, but arising from the LHWCA, a federal statute).
This Comment also focuses on a policy analysis in deciding whetherto allow any state law actions. An
important issue not directly addressed in this Comment is the effect of federal preemption doctrines on
state law remedies. Cf Texas Employers Ins. Assn v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
Moreover, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, a strong legal argument can be made that the
LHWCA preempts any state law remedies. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485
(1986) (dismissing plaintiffs' wrongful death claims after concluding that the Death on the High Seas Act
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For these reasons, the opinion should be read narrowly, leading to the
conclusion that the district court held only that the LHWCA is the exclusive
remedy for injuries sustained due to bad faith claims practices.
The Ninth Circuit opinion is somewhat unclear as to which approach the
court has taken, 117 but should be read to bar only bad faith actions, and is
thus consistent with the Compromise approach. First, the case involved
allegations of bad faith conduct and not intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 118 Second, the Ninth Circuit relied on authority that bars an action
outside the compensation system when "ordinary refusal to pay" is in-
volved. 119 Also, the court distinguished the First Circuit decision as involv-
ing conduct that was "conspicuously contemptible" and beyond ordinary
refusal to pay.12 0 This implies that the court did not reach the issue of
whether the LHWCA would also bar a state law action based on outrageous
conduct. Finally, the Ninth Circuit ultimately relied on the statutory
penalty provisions to conclude that the LHWCA barred a federal bad faith
action. 12 1 Although the court provided no explicit rationale for this con-
clusion, it must have implicitly relied on legislative intent. The Ninth
Circuit opinion should be read to adopt the Compromise approach since
this approach is most consistent with hypothesized Congressional intent.
The preceding analysis of the three opinions makes clear that, in com-
bination, the federal courts have implicitly adopted the Compromise ap-
proach. The First Circuit decision allows actions based on outrageous
conduct and severe injury, while the Eastern District of Texas and Ninth
Circuit decisions reject actions based on unreasonable or bad faith conduct.
This approach best furthers the policies underlying the LHWCA.
preempts state wrongful death statutes when an accident occurs on the high seas). Detailed analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
117. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
118. The opinion noted that the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs "suffered severe emo-
tional distress or that it was inflicted intentionally, let alone with actual malice." Sample v. Johnson, 771
F.2d 1335, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1206 (1986). Also, the plaintiffs' brief asked the
Ninth Circuit to recognize a federal action for "bad faith" termination of compensation benefits. Ap-
pellants' Opening Brief at 50, Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1206 (1986). On the facts, then, the case provides precedent for denial of only a bad faith action.
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C. The LHWCA Does Not Need to Be Updated by Creation of a Bad
Faith Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision
One commentator has suggested that the unprecedented growth of stat-
utory law in recent years, coupled with the inability of many legislatures to
keep these statutes up to date, demands that courts take a more activist
stance in reviewing and interpreting statutes. 122 That commentator argues
that a court should no longer defer to legislatures to update a statute
rendered obsolete or inadequate by changes in legal doctrine since enact-
ment of the legislation.' 2 3 A student commentator has suggested that
creation of exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule in workers' compensa-
tion cases may be desirable to readjust an outdated statute. 124 Under this
analysis, even though the Compromise approach best furthers the general
policies of the LHWCA, a court should still attempt to readjust the
"outdated" or "obsolete" LHWCA and recognize an action for bad faith.
Even accepting the theory that courts should modify obsolete statutes
and that creation of exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule is an appropri-
ate use of this kind of judicial power, courts should not create a bad faith
exception to the LHWCA.
The student commentator relies on five factors to conclude that courts
should create exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule. First, expansion of
tort liability has changed the legal landscape in such a way as to render the
original legislative compromise inequitable and obsolete. 125 Second, crea-
tion of exceptions furthers the workers' compensation goals of compensat-
ing injured workers and improving workplace safety. 12 6 Third, reliance on
original legislative intent is not helpful because the legal landscape is mark-
edly changed since the compensation statutes were originally enacted. 127
Fourth, the exception should have workable boundaries. 128 Finally, while
122. See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
123. Professor Calabresi argues that courts should decide when a statute has become so out of phase
with the whole legal framework that, whatever the age of the statute, it can only stand if the legislature
reaffirms it. Id. at 164. This result is accomplished by placing the burden ofovercoming legislative inertia
on the parties whose desires do not conform with the fabric of the law, and hence whose wishes can only be
recognized if current legislative support exists for them. Id. Professor Calabresi also argues that courts
may place the burden of reforming an obsolete or inadequate statute on the group benefiting from the
statute's obsolescence. Id. He does not, however, discuss whether his doctrine should apply to the
LHWCA.
124. Comment, supra note 3, at 1654-55.
125. Id. at 1655.
126. Id. at 1643-48, 1661.
127. Id. at 1655-57.
128. Id. at 1658.
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complete revision of compensation laws is beyond the institutional compe-
tence of the courts, creation of exceptions would break the logjam of legis-
lative inertia and result in reform of the compensation laws. 129
Applying these five concepts to the LHWCA, however, shows that
federal courts should not create a bad faith exception to the LHWCA. First,
although changes in the legal landscape have occurred since 1927, and even
since major revisions of the LHWCA in 1972,130 the LHWCA as a whole is
not so outdated as to be obsolete or inadequate. The 1972 amendments
substantially increased employee benefits in accord with nearly every
recommendation of the National Commission on State Workmen's Com-
pensation. 131 In addition, although Congress was aware of the emergence
of bad faith liability for employers and insurers, substantial 1984 amend-
ments to the LHWCA failed to change the penalty provisions in any way. ' 32
Thus, it is not at all clear that the LHWCA is obsolete or a proper candidate
for judicial creation of a bad faith exception to the exclusive remedy
provision.
Second, the argument that insurers and employers are better able to bear
the costs of injuries resulting from bad faith conduct is alone insufficient
justification for imposing liability. 133 This is particularly true under the
LHWCA, which effectively places the risk of wrongful delay on long-
shoremen, not employers or insurers. 134 Under the LHWCA, Congress
129. For example, judicial creation of a bad faith exception in Wisconsin spurred the legislature to
amend the penalty provisions of the state workers' compensation law. See supra note 53; see also
Comment, supra note 3, at 1659 (arguing that judicial creation of exceptions could spur legislatures to
address workers' compensation issues and alleviate many of the deficiencies identified a decade ago by
the National Commission on State Workmens' Compensation Laws).
130. For instance, only in the last few years have courts begun to recognize an action against insurers
for bad faith. This action did not exist in 1927 and was not widely recognized in 1972. Also, the LHWCA is
an "expansionist" statute in that it expands the rights of the statutory beneficiaries beyond those available
at common law. Workers' compensation statutes are generally considered to be expansionist in nature. G.
CAt ABRESI, supra note 122. at 139. It could be argued that further expansions in tort liability. such as the
creation of a bad faith action, should be incorporated into the statute so that it maintains its expansionist
character. Finally, longer administrative delays in resolving disputed claims allow insurers to force
premature settlements by injured employees. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13 1. A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.30, at 17 n.52 (Supp. 1984).
132. The 1984 amendments included the addition of provisions forbad faith conduct by employers in
reporting injuries. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 n.9 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
Also. in the early 1980's there has been a significant increase in the number of bad faith suits brought
against insurers in the workers' compensation context. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
133. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 811 (the policies of accident protection and loss distribution are
"antithetical to the workers' compensation system"). Cf Comment, supra note 3, at 1646-48 (using an
economic analysis to argue that employers are the appropriate party to bear accident costs).
134. The LHWCA provides that an employer may controvert payment and then suspend payment of
benefits until an administrative law judge resolves the dispute. See supra note 26. Other compensation
statutes, in contrast, provide that an employer may controvert compensation, but must continue to pay
benefits in the interim between termination of benefits and a decision by the administrative agency
resolving the dispute. See, e.g.. Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556,559 (D. Conn. 1985)
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gave employers and insurers a unilateral right to suspend payment of
compensation, effectively placing the risk of wrongful termination of
benefits on the employee. Congress mitigated the burden on the employee
by providing provisions for the award of penalties, attorneys' fees, and
interest on the amounts unpaid during the interim period. 135 Even though
the employer or insurer could better afford the costs, Congress placed the
additional costs on employees.
Third, while original legislative intent in the drafting of the LHWCA in
1927 or 1972 is unhelpful because of the relatively recent development of
bad faith actions, analysis of all the policies underlying the LHWCA yields
the conclusion that courts should not recognize a bad faith action. 136
Fourth, the tort of bad faith does not have workable boundaries to prevent
disintegration of the compensation system. The tort focuses on the reason-
ableness of an insurer's conduct, an inquiry akin to negligence. This type of
tort should be covered by the LHWCA. 137 Also, the intent requirement
could become attenuated, allowing too many frivolous actions. 138
Finally, it is unlikely that creation of a bad faith exception alone would
spur Congress to act. If a court recognizes a bad faith exception, the burden
of overturning legislative inertia is placed on insurers and employers. Their
only remedy to what they feel is an inequitable situation is to seek amend-
ment of the LHWCA to bar bad faith actions or to include bad faith actions
under the coverage of the statute. Although they may have a strong Con-
gressional lobby, it is highly unlikely that employers and insurers alone
could bring about amendment to the LHWCA. 139
However, if a court fails to create a bad faith exception, an employee is
not left entirely without redress for injuries sustained as the result of
wrongful delay or termination of compensation benefits. First, an employee
may recover penalties, attorneys' fees, and prejudgment interest. Second,
(discussing the Connecticut compensation act and its failure to allow for unilateral discontinuance of
benefits).
135. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 88.
139. The 1984 amendments to the LHWCA resulted from years of pressure by interest groups
representing employers, insurers, and employees. All of these groups had to cooperate to spurlegislative
action. 130CONG. REC. S11,622(dailyed. Sept. 20,1984) (statement ofSen. Hatch: "TheLongshoreAct
does not lend itself to amendment easily or often . . . . [The 1984 amendments reflect] a fragile
consensus, carefully crafted over the last several years."). The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA also
resulted from over30 years ofpressure by employers, insurers, andemployees. If courts create a bad faith
action, employees would have no incentive to cooperate in amending the LHWCA. In fact, they would
have an incentive to fight reform ofthe LHWCA, ensuring legislative deadlock. See also R. MNOOKIN, IN
THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1985) (noting that passing
legislation is much more difficult than blocking legislation and that judicially created policies which
would never have been enacted legislatively may prove impossible for the legislature to overturn).
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if the insurer's conduct is sufficiently outrageous, an employee can sue for
damages under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 140
Third, if an employee is suffering because of the long delays associated
with the administrative process, the employee may be able to bring an
action against the administrative agency to recover damages and seek an
injunction to require quicker resolution of disputes in the future. 141 The
underlying basis for bad faith suits is probably, at heart, an employee's
dissatisfaction with the long delays before an administrative law judge
resolves the dispute. 142 A more honest approach to the problem would be to
permit a class action suit, rather than to create a bad faith exception.
III. CONCLUSION
Federal courts facing the issue of whether to allow an action against an
insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress or bad faith in
handling LHWCA claims should follow the Compromise approach. Fed-
eral courts should reject claims alleging bad faith since these claims rest on
the unreasonableness of an insurer's conduct and are properly encom-
passed within the exclusive remedy and penalty provisions of the LHWCA.
On the other hand, federal courts should allow actions for intentional
infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff can meet the high standard of
proof by showing deliberate intent by the insurer to injure the plaintiff,
outrageous conduct by the insurer, and severe emotional distress suffered
by the plaintiff. The Compromise approach strikes the best balance be-
tween the competing interests of the employer, insurer, and employee by
furthering the LHWCA policies of compensating injured employees, limit-
ing employer and insurer liability, and allocating the risks of industrial
accidents.
Gregory L. Russell
140. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (Ist Cir. 1974).
141. In fact, the plaintiffs in Sample alleged such a cause of action, but the Ninth Circuit dismissed
the action on moomess grounds. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F. 2d 1335,1343 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1206 (1986). However, the court's opinion indicated that the same claims might not be moot if
brought as a class action. Id. at 1339. The plaintiffs in Sample were suing in their individual capacities. Id.
at 1338.
142. See, e.g., Garrett v. Washington AirCompressorCo., 466A.2d462,463 (D.C. 1983) (plaintiff
filed suit against his employer and compensation carrier after "[hle apparently became frustrated with the
slow pace of the administrative process .. ").
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